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The purpose of this paper is to study the differential and complementary role played by
the theory of planned behavior (TPB) variables and by participants’ emotions when
recalling and describing previous experiences of such risk behavior in the prediction of
the intention to repeat a risk behavior in the immediate future. We chose the behavior of
occasional excessive drinking, a risk behavior characterized by evoking attitudinal
ambivalence and eliciting mixed emotions, joy and sadness. The results show that emotional
ambivalence is not equivalent to attitudinal ambivalence (whose indexes include that of
the affective component), and that this emotional information is relevant for predicting
the intention to repeat the risk behavior in the near future, enhancing the prediction of
the TPB model.
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En este trabajo estudiamos el papel diferencial y complementario que juegan las emociones
sentidas cuando se recuerda y describe una experiencia personal pasada en la conducta
de riesgo junto con las variables clásicas de la teoría de la conducta planificada en la
predicción de la intención de repetir dicha conducta de riesgo en un futuro cercano.
Hemos elegido la conducta de beber puntualmente alcohol en exceso, una conducta
caracterizada por evocar actitudes ambivalentes y emociones mixtas (alegría y tristeza).
Los resultados muestran que la ambivalencia emocional no es equivalente a la
ambivalencia actitudinal (cuyos índices incluyen la ambivalencia del componente afectivo
de las actitudes), y que esta información emocional es un factor relevante para predecir
mejor la intención de repetir la conducta de riesgo en el futuro cercano.
Palabras clave: ambivalencia actitudinal, ambivalencia emocional, emociones mixtas,
conducta de riesgo
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Our aim in this study is to analyze the complementary
role in the prediction of the intention to repeat a given risk
behavior played by the theory of planned behavior (TPB;
Ajzen, 1988, 1991) variables and by participants’ mixed
emotions when they recall and describe their personal
experience of that risk behavior. We report our results on
the behavior of occasional (not habitual) heavy drinking.
This is not a study on the problem of alcohol dependence,
but rather deals with its excessive use occasionally (a
behavior commonly observed in young people over the
weekend). We did not impose an objective criterion for
“excess of alcohol,” opting instead for a personal and
subjective norm, that of our participants’ perception, so as
to comprise all the individual features and differences. We
would like to emphasize that our participants are not
alcoholic: they drink excessive alcohol in very specific
situations (e.g., some parties, or some weekends), but not
daily. The choice of this behavior is explained by both its
social and theoretical importance. In Spain, alcohol is still
a “social drug” used in a ritual fashion at many everyday
events (e.g., toasting at celebrations), and which has
considerable social and economic consequences for public
health. Thus, Becoña (2000) pointed out, based on the data
from a 1998 survey of Spanish schoolchildren aged 14 to
18, that alcohol was the most widely consumed drug: over
80% of young people had consumed it in the last year, with
a mean age at first consumption of 13.6 years. In a recent
study, it was found that 67% of adolescents aged 14 to 16
drank alcohol, mainly on weekends and at parties (Caballero
et al., 2004).
Our choice of this behavior is also important from a
theoretical point of view, given that consumption of alcohol
is associated with high levels of attitudinal ambivalence
(Conner & Sparks, 2002), and this moderator clearly reduces
the associations between attitude and intention-behavior
(Cooke & Sheeran, 2004). Attitudinal ambivalence reduces
both the temporal stability of the attitude (Conner, Sherlock,
& Orbell, 1998) and its influence on behavioral intention
and on the behavior itself (Conner, Sparks, Povey, James,
& Shepherd, 1998). Drinking is clearly a behavior about
which it is difficult to make predictions solely from
attitudinal models such as that of the TPB, and further work
in the field is necessary to try to overcome this shortcoming.
The study presented here attempts to make a contribution
in this direction, by considering participants’ emotional
experience when they recall and describe a situation in which
they have performed this behavior. Our aim is to add
information about “emotional ambivalence” as measured by
self-report items referring to two emotions (joy-sadness)
with opposing valences and arousal level. We choose these
diametrically opposite emotions because they represent the
best example of mixed emotion (e.g., Larsen, McGraw &
Cacioppo, 2001; Russell & Carroll, 1999), and they will
allow us to compare more clearly attitudinal and emotional
ambivalence. We also focus on the role of these specific
emotions (joy and sadness), because in our previous studies
they were the emotions most frequently and clearly
associated with several risk behaviors (see Carrera,
Caballero, Sánchez, & Blanco, 2005; Sánchez, Caballero,
Carrera, Blanco, & Pizarro, 2001). In this paper, we shall
not (as we did elsewhere) explore whether these two
emotions are felt simultaneously or sequentially, or the
consequences of these patterns for ambivalence and behavior
(see Carrera & Oceja, 2007). 
The influence between affect and cognition seems to
be clearly bidirectional (see Forgas, 2001). Along this line,
authors such as Giner-Sorolla (1999) or Ajzen and Fishbein
(2000) have argued for a differentiation of the concepts
of attitude and affect, and we also stress the difference
between the affective component of attitudes and the
emotions experienced in relation to the object of an
attitude.
We are aware that the affective component of attitude
focuses on the evaluative implications of all types of
affective experiences, including (but not exclusively)
emotions elicited by attitude objects (Haddock & Zanna,
1998; 1999). In risk behaviors such as that studied here,
the emotional reactions experienced when performing the
behavior or when recalling it may be of great importance
in relation to the decision whether or not to repeat it, and
we believe that this information is not sufficiently covered
in the items generally used for measuring the affective
component of attitude (e.g., “What are your feelings
about…”). Such items usually inquire about the association
between the behavior or object analyzed and the affective
dimension. However, this association does not mean that
the subject has experienced these emotions on performing
the behavior, or that he or she experiences them during
recall.  Indeed, in the opinion of some authors, participants
may respond to attitudinal scales considering only the
semantic relationships, in the sense that people who judge
something positively associate positive feelings with it
(see Robinson & Clore, 2002). People may associate
emotions with behaviors even though they have no direct
experience of them (e.g., I associate disgust with eating
sushi, but I have never tried it, so I have never felt disgust
eating sushi). As Robinson and Clore pointed out,
emotions are momentary experiences, but people possess
beliefs about their emotions, and the two things do not
always coincide. 
Recent research has also explored the differential weight
of the cognitive component and the affective component
of attitudes, finding that the affective component appears
to have more influence than the cognitive one on behavioral
intentions for a variety of behaviors, especially in people
that are under affective control (Trafimow et al., 2004).
Previous studies have shown, in work with risk behaviors
(e.g., unprotected sex), that considering the TPB variables
and emotions experienced in the past (and now recalled)
improves predictions about intention to repeat them
CABALLERO, CARRERA, MUÑOZ, AND SÁNCHEZ152
(Caballero, Carrera, Sánchez, Muñoz, & Blanco, 2003;
Carrera et al., 2005; Sánchez, et al., 2001). It is extremely
difficult to obtain data on the real emotions felt, and
therefore, in the present study, we decided to use an
intermediate procedure between experiential knowledge and
memory, asking participants to describe a real situation in
which they had carried out the risk behavior and to report
the emotions evoked by that memory now (mentally re-
enacting a past situation). In this line, our aim here is to
make progress regarding consideration of the re-enacted
emotional experience as a predictor variable. Our second
goal in this study will be to test whether emotional
ambivalence, as calculated from specific emotional
experiences, is equivalent to attitudinal affective
ambivalence as measured from affective attitudinal scales.
Both goals relate to the exploration of the hypothesized
lack of absolute equivalence between emotional experience
and attitudinal measures.
Method
Participants, Measures, and Procedure
Participants were 100 students (89% women and 11%
men) nearing the end of their degree courses at the
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, with a mean age of 22.9
years. One participant did not finish the questionnaire, and
was therefore ruled out of the analysis. All had experience
in the risk behavior studied (i.e., “occasional excessive
alcohol consumption”), measured subjectively, according to
their own experience. We did not filter the sample according
to actual amount of alcohol drunk; rather, our criterion was
their subjective consideration that they had drunk too much.
We designed a questionnaire, guaranteeing anonymity, in
order to gather the following information:
1. Personal data: age, sex. 
2. Frequency of occasional excessive alcohol consumption,
rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (very
frequently), and how long ago it last happened (days,
weeks, months, or years ago).
3. Participants’ attitude towards the behavior under study,
measured with an item referring to general attitude (Do
you think the behavior of occasional excessive drinking
is…?) and two further items dealing with different
components of attitude: the cognitive component (When
you think about the behavior of excessive drinking, to
what extent are the thoughts that come to mind…?) and
the affective component (When you think about the
behavior of excessive drinking, to what extent are your
feelings .…?). In all three cases, two scales are used:
positive and negative, both rated on 7-point scales ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
4. Direct measure of ambivalent thoughts (“I feel confused,”
“I have doubts”) and ambivalent feelings (“I feel a
bitter-sweet sensation,” “I feel a mixture of emotions”)
evoked in participants by the behavior in question, rated
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all)  to 7 (very
much).
5. Perceived control of the behavior, rated on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). 
6. Subjective norm, measured by two items: friends’ (peers’)
judgment of the behavior—positive and negative, both
rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(very much)—and participants’ agreement with that
judgment, rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very
low) to 7  (very high).
7. The emotions currently felt by participants, at the time
of completing the questionnaire, on recalling and
describing the experience in which they drank most
excessively; this was measured using two emotional
categories (joy and sadness). Intensity of this emotional
experience was measured with a strictly unipolar scale
in which participants had to answer the question I feel
this emotion, with “yes” or “no;” if the answer was
affirmative, the next question was how intense was that
emotion? This was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (very intensely). They were free to
indicate none, one, or two emotions. 
In order to facilitate the induction of emotions,
participants were asked to describe in detail what they
drank and how much, where they were, with whom,
what happened, and how long ago. As mentioned, the
perception of “excessive” in relation to alcohol
consumption was subjective: We preferred not to impose
any objective criterion, leaving it to the participant to
judge.
8. Finally, we asked about their intention to repeat the risk
behavior in the coming weeks, on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strong).
Results
Participants in this study presented a mean frequency
of carrying out this risk behavior that can be described
as “moderate” on the 7-point scale (M = 3.6, SD = 1.2),
and the time they had drunk most excessively was
relatively recent: a few months ago (M = 3.4, SD = .83).
General attitude in the positive dimension showed a mean
of 1.5 (SD = .83), and in the negative dimension, a mean
of 6.09 (SD = .97). We also calculated the general attitude
by averaging both items (negative and recoded positive)
into one scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .73), and the mean
was 6.28 (SD = .80), showing that this risk behavior is
judged negatively: Young people consider it an undesirable
behavior. In general, it appears that participants perceive
their peers as judging the behavior slightly more positively
than they do, both in the positive dimension (M = 3.5, SD
= 1.6) and the negative one (M = 4.3, SD = 1.7). We also
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calculated Cronbach’s alpha for these dimensions, which
was found to be significant (.83). We averaged the two
items (negative and recoded positive dimension) into one
scale, which also showed a negative evaluation, but less
so than in the case of personal attitude (M = 4.5, SD =
1.6). Contrast of means for related samples between
general attitude index and perception of peers’ judgment
was significant, t(98) = 28.5, p < .001. Mean level of
agreement with peers’ opinions was moderately high (M
= 4.7, SD = 1.8). Subjective norm was calculated as the
product of the mean of negative and recoded positive
judgment of peers’ behavior and participants’ agreement
with that judgment (M = 22.9, SD =14.4). Perceived
control over the behavior showed very high levels of such
perception (M = 5.8, SD = 1.2). 
With the aim of measuring attitudinal ambivalence, we
used various indicators, some direct and others indirect,
employing in the latter case one of the most frequently used
formulas for calculating ambivalence in the field of attitudes,
that of Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995):
Ambivalence = [(positive information + negative
information)/2] – positive information-negative information.
This index is applied to both attitudinal and emotional
information, in the latter case, considering the emotions
of opposing valences experienced and described by the
participants (joy-sadness). Given that the scales employed
have seven points, this ambivalence index ranges from
–2 to 7.
Ambivalence Indexes
As regards indirect general attitudinal ambivalence, we
applied the same ambivalence index to participants’
judgments of the studied behavior, through the positive and
negative items, obtaining a low general attitudinal
ambivalence (M = -0.75, SD = 1.5). 
In order to measure indirect cognitive attitudinal
ambivalence we applied the same index to the thoughts that
participants associated with the behavior, through the positive
and negative items, obtaining a moderate-low level of
indirect cognitive ambivalence (M = 0.10, SD = 2.0).
Likewise, in order to obtain the level of indirect affective
attitudinal ambivalence, we applied the same index to
participants’ feelings associated with the behavior, through
the positive and negative items, obtaining a moderate-low
level of indirect affective ambivalence (M = 0.22, SD = 1.9).
Given our interest in examining closely the emotional
experience of those who practice this risk behavior, we
included in the questionnaire, as described above, other,
more direct measures of the emotions experienced now, on
recalling a personal instance of the behavior. We were thus
also able to apply Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin’s (1995)
ambivalence index, taking the emotional experience reported
by participants at present when recalling the time they
consumed most alcohol: the emotion of joy as an indicator
of positive dimension, and sadness as an indicator of
negative dimension, obtaining in “emotional ambivalence”
a mean of .29 (SD = 1.24). Emotional ambivalence was
higher than general attitudinal ambivalence, t(98) = 5.10,
p < .001.
Because mixed emotions are rather scarce (see Carrera
& Oceja, 2007; Russell & Carroll, 1999), we only obtained
22 participants who reported joy and sadness at the same
time, obtaining an “emotional ambivalence” mean of 1.6
(SD = 1.3, N = 22). In this sub-sample, emotional
ambivalence was also higher than general attitudinal
ambivalence, t(21) = 3.9, p < .001.
The questionnaire also included direct items for
measuring the attitudinal ambivalence of both the cognitive
and affective components. Participants obtained moderate
values on these items: confused (M = 2.75, SD = 1.7),
doubts (M = 2.76, SD = 1.7), bitter-sweet (M = 3.44, SD
= 1.7), a mixture of emotions (M = 3.87, SD = 1.9).
Attitudinal Ambivalence and Emotional Ambivalence
One of the goals of our study was to explore the
relationship between the affective component and the
emotions felt at the time of recalling the risk behavior. We
therefore calculated the correlation between the indexes of
general attitudinal ambivalence, indirect cognitive
ambivalence, indirect affective ambivalence, and emotional
ambivalence. The relationships between all measured
variables are shown in Table 1.
As Table 1 shows, we did not find a significant
relationship between attitudinal ambivalence indicators and
emotional ambivalence as measured from the direct
experience of the joy-sadness. This lack of overlap suggests
that attitudinal ambivalence (whether it be general,
cognitive, or affective, and measured from direct or indirect
items) is not equivalent to the emotions felt on recalling
the occasion of most excessive drinking. These results
indicate that whereas the specific emotional experience
forms part of the affective component of attitude, the two
are not equivalent, as attitude contains other factors in
addition to emotions (e.g., automatic preferences, vicarious
emotions, or implicit affect) that can explain these
differences; more importantly, attitude implies an evaluation
of this affective information. Previous results showed
inconsistency between different kinds of attitudinal
ambivalence indexes (direct, indirect, cognitive, affective,
general) (e.g., Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1995).
Along the same line, our data show inconsistency between
emotional and all attitudinal reports, including subjective
norm and perceived control. However, correlations between
TPB variables and indirect attitudinal ambivalence
indicators were significant. We should like to emphasize
that these results must be considered with caution because
the number of items used for each variable was low (one
or two).
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Prediction of Intention to Repeat the Risk Behavior
in the Future
Influence of TPB variables on prediction of intention to
repeat excessive drinking behavior. Having carried out these
descriptive analyses on the TPB variables and emotions
associated with the risk behavior under study (excessive
drinking), we set out to examine the role played by these
variables in prediction of the intention to repeat the risk
behavior. If we found emotions to be relevant for improving
the prediction of intentions, in future research, we would
explore the role of emotional experience as moderator in
the attitude-intention relationship. For this purpose, we
carried out a set of regression analyses with standardized
scores for controlling factor variability level. Results on
participants’ intention to repeat the behavior in the immediate
future were low (M = 1.94, SD = 1.35), despite the fact that
all participants had experience of the behavior.
We first performed a regression analysis incorporating
the classic TPB variables. We included general attitude
towards the behavior (averaged between negative and
recoded positive dimensions), perceived control, and
subjective social norm (calculated as the product of the mean
of negative and recoded positive judgment of the behavior
attributed to peers and participants’ agreement with that
judgment), all in standardized scores. According to this
model, F(3, 76) = 3.11, p < .05, the TPB variables explained
7% of intention to repeat the risk behavior, and perceived
control was the most relevant variable in that prediction (β
= –.22, p < .05). 
TPB + attitudinal ambivalence. We performed another
regression analysis, adding to the standardized TPB variables
those of indirect general, cognitive, and affective attitudinal
ambivalence. Attitudinal ambivalence indexes did not
produce a significant change in the prediction of intention
to repeat the risk behavior.
Likewise, adding the items of direct attitudinal
ambivalence (cognitive and affective) to the standardized
TPB variables did not lead to changes in level of explanation. 
TPB + emotional ambivalence. When we added
emotional ambivalence to the TPB information (general
attitude, perceived control, and subjective norm), considering
the complete sample (including participants who reported
only joy or sadness; when only one emotion is reported,
emotional ambivalence is negative or very low, as the
Thompson et al. Index shows), the regression analysis showed
a significant improvement, from 7 to 14% (p < .01). The
best predictors in the second model, F(4, 75) = 4.15, p <
.01, were emotional ambivalence (β = –.27, p < .01) and
perceived control (β = –.19, p = .08), with general attitude
(β = –.19, p = .09) at the level of a trend. Following
Trafimow’s (2004) suggestions, we used binomial effect size
display (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) in order to reveal
the real meaning of the change in R2. We calculated the
change in percentage of successes from the first (R1= .33)
to the second model (R2 = .42). This analysis showed that
the ∆R2 of 7% implies, when corrected, an increase in the
probability of success of 5%, a moderate improvement.
When we repeated the above regression analysis taking
into account only those participants who reported joy and
sadness at the same time, the sample was reduced to 22
Table 1
Correlations between all Measured Variables
General Subjective   Perceived     Confused Doubts Bitter Mixture of Indirect Indirect Indirect 
attitude norm control -sweet emotions general cognitive affective
attitudinal ambivalence ambivalence
ambivalence
Subjective norm .33**
Perceived control .31** .006
Confused –.13 .05 .009
Doubts –.08 –.04 –.06 .63**
Bitter-sweet –.10 –.06 –.16 .30** .31**
Mixture of emotions –.25* .05 –.14 .47** .42** .60**
Indirect general attitudinal 
ambivalence –.96** –.25* –.35** .17 .09 .11 .28**
Indirect cognitive ambivalence –.64** –.26* –.31** .18 .23* .22* .33** .59***
Indirect affective ambivalence –.60** –.32** –.22* .26** .20* .29** .42** .57*** .68***
Mixed emotional experience 
joy-sadness .06 –.02 .15 –.08 –.11 –.07 –.07 –.03 –.12 –.03
Mixed Emotional Experience 
joy-sadness (n = 22) –.003 –.25 .09 .08 .13 –.05 –.25 .03 .10 .009
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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participants. This regression analysis shows an improvement
from the first model, F (3, 18) = .83, p > .05,—which
explains 2%—to the second model, F (4, 17) = 2.7, p <
.05,—which explains 24%—so that the improvement is
significant (p < .01). The best predictor in the second model
was emotional ambivalence (β = –.54, p < .01). We made
the correction for attenuation due to unreliability of the
measurements and then calculated the change in percentage
of successes from the first (R1 = .34) to the second model
(R2 = .62). When ∆R2 is conceptualized in terms of change
in probability of success, the improvement is still moderate
(12%). Of course, this sample is very small, but we feel it
is relevant because mixed emotions are scarce. In any case,
the results must be considered with caution.
In general, these results reveal the importance of
perceived control as a variable to take into account in the
explanation of excessive alcohol consumption in young
people, in the sense that the less the perception of control
in this behavior, the greater the intention to repeat the risk
behavior in the immediate future, bearing in mind that our
participants have experience in this risk behavior. Even more
interesting is the fact that if we add emotional ambivalence
to the TPB information, the change in prediction was from
7 to 14% of intention to repeat the risk behavior. When we
correct the value of this improvement following Trafimow’s
(2004) suggestions, the change in probability of success is
5%, a low but acceptable figure, as R1 is moderate (.33).
Also, this result suggests that the lesser the emotional
ambivalence (i.e., the participant feels one emotion more
strongly—probably joy—on recalling the behavior) and
perceived control, the greater the intention to repeat the risk
behavior in the near future. 
Discussion
Research aimed at explaining and predicting human
behavior has found in attitudes one of the most powerful
variables for its prediction (TRA, Fishbein, & Ajzen,
1975; and TPB, Ajzen, 1988, 1991). In general, there
appears to be a broad consensus on the identification of
different components of attitude, basically: the cognitive
component, usually measured through questions on the
thoughts and beliefs associated with the object of attitude,
the affective component, which generally refers to
emotions and feelings associated with the object, and the
behavioral component, which refers to the practice of
the behavior related to the object of attitude. Attitudes,
perceived control, and social norms (the components of
TPB) provide an excellent basis for the prediction of
human behavior on most occasions, especially when
decisions are made in a highly rational way. 
In our study, we examined the importance of these
attitudinal components in the explanation and prediction
of the intention to repeat a particular risk behavior:
occasional excessive drinking in young people.
Furthermore, we explored the extent to which the
incorporation of the re-enacted emotional experience (i.e.,
the emotions actually felt now on recalling the risk
behavior) improves prediction of this risk behavior, as we
consider it important to make a very clear distinction
between this emotional experience and the affective
component of attitudes (see Giner-Sorolla, 1999). Previous
studies have found considerable relevance of the
relationship between intentional behavior and anticipated
emotional experience (Hynie, MacDonald, & Marques,
2006; Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995; Richard, de
Vries, & van der Plig, 1998; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999); we
have previously explored a similar relationship in relation
to risk behaviors and recalled emotions (Caballero et al.,
2003; Carrera et al., 2005). Our aim in the present work
was to replicate and enlarge upon these results with other
behaviors and to improve the measurements of emotions,
using not anticipated or recalled emotions but rather
emotions induced when participants recall and describe
their risk episode. Furthermore, given that risk behavior
is associated with positive and negative consequences, we
explored the extent to which participants experienced
ambivalent attitudes and emotional ambivalence on drinking
excessively, and how this information improves prediction
from the TPB model.
Our results show a low general attitudinal ambivalence,
corresponding to the negative consideration of this behavior,
whereas the levels of cognitive ambivalence and affective
ambivalence were moderate, both when measured directly
and when measured indirectly. Levels of emotional
ambivalence were also moderate, but higher than those of
cognitive and affective ambivalence.
With a view to exploring the relationships between the
attitudinal components and the current emotional experience
on recalling the behavior, we analyzed the correlations
between the different indexes of attitudinal ambivalence and
the emotional ambivalence index. We found high and
positive correlations between all attitudinal indexes, whereas
none of them correlated significantly with emotional
ambivalence measured through joy and sadness. We should
like to emphasize that the correlation between affective
ambivalence and emotional ambivalence was clearly
nonsignificant. 
These results reaffirm our proposal for a differential and
complementary consideration of the affective-evaluative
component of attitude and the emotional experience itself,
so that, although the specific emotions experienced may
form part of the affective component of attitude, they are
not necessarily equivalent to it. Secondly, considering the
two types of information in an independent and
complementary manner helps us to make more reliable
predictions of the intention to repeat the behavior.
Taken overall, these results suggest that the variables
considered by the TPB have moderate (7%, N = 100)
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predictive power in the intention to repeat excessive drinking
behavior, and that perceived control is the most important
aspect in predicting this intention. We stress the fact that
participants perceive this behavior as controllable, despite
the fact that they have experience of repeating it and the
intention to do so, although our results show that the lower
the perceived control, the greater the intention to repeat.
None of the attitudinal variables were seen to play a
significant role in the prediction of alcohol consumption;
as mentioned, only perceived control emerges with
significant explanatory power.
When we finally included emotional ambivalence
together with the TPB variables, we obtained an
improvement in the probability of prediction of 5% (12%
when N = 22). We should like to emphasize that simple
emotions, individually, did not increase the percentage of
explanation: what increased it was the emotional ambivalence
between the two opposite emotions (mixed emotion of joy
and sadness).
Despite the fact that the improvement was low (though
significant), the results obtained provide a good starting
point that permits us to confirm the relevance of
incorporating such current emotional experience in the
prediction of the risk behavior studied. We point out that
these results are only a first step in exploring the role of
current (not only remembered or anticipated) emotions in
the prediction of behavior; moreover, we are aware that one
of the most important limitations of this study is the low
number of items for measuring attitude and emotion, so that
the results must be considered as preliminary. It is therefore
necessary to continue research in this line, improving the
measures of attitudes and emotions; manipulating the
emotions (e.g., emotion induction paradigm) and using path
analysis. The improvement found in the level of explanation
encourages us to continue research on the role of emotion
in the prediction of risk behavior.
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